The War in Bosnia - part two

                  CHAPTER 2


         BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA WITHIN YUGOSLAVIA

    Bosnia-Herzegovina before the "Agrokomerc Affair"

The 1974 Amendments to the Yugoslav Constitution are of such importance
that they are usually referred to as the 1974 Constitution.  Just as they
have done for other republics, these Amendments have confirmed the
statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  However, in order to keep those
Amendments from becoming just some dead letters on paper, the Bosnian
patriots who were a part of the then leadership were forced to fight a
long battle with the Serbian lobby in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Using the
terminology of that d ay, the Serbian lobby was referred to as the
"unitarists", which means that they prefered the idea strong central
government in Belgrade rather than strong governments in republics, while
the other side, which was fighting for a stronger "statehood" for Bosnia
was referred to as the "separatists."  Working under the conditions of the
communist rules (rubber stamping), that struggle was conducted using an
intricate, code language so that the majority of the Bosnians weren't sure
who is who.  The words "un itarists" and the "separatists" were used
often, but only in a general context, without pointing to a particular
person.  Among those struggling for the independence of Bosnia, the main
protagonists were Mr. Dzemal Bijedic, Hamdija Pozderac and Dr. Fuad M
uhic.  Among the Croats of Bosnia the main activists were Mr. Branko
Mikulic and Hrvoje Istuk.  There weren't any particularly noticeable
opposition (Serbian) members.  There was no need.  The members of the
Serbian community, on all levels were working d iligently towards the
"strengthening of Yugoslavia."  In reality, that meant employing as many
Serbs as possible in government, army, police, universities, schools,
better and more prestigious companies and so on.  The Serbs kept control
over the Yugosla v People Army (JNA) and over the counter intelligence
organization, (KOS).  Prior to the 1974 Constitutional Amendments, the
Serbs have completely controlled all of those organizations.  Early in
1977, Mr. Dzemal Bijedic was killed while functioning as th e president of
the Federal Executive Committee (the governing body of Yugoslavia).  The
so-called accident in which he died (near Sarajevo) has never been
completely explained.  The Bosnjaks have never fully understood how much
they have lost by the death of Mr. Dzemal Bijedic.  At a ceremony marking
the fourth anniversary of his death, two documentaries about his life and
works were shown to the faculty of the Mostar University, which was named
after him.  One of those films was about Bijedic's official travels, the
other was about his work in the federal Executive Cancel. 

During the second film there were several of his discussions, that were
presented without any editing and without any "glossing over" of the
issues.  Such open discussions have never been shown to the general
public.  But those documentaries have shown th e courage and enthusiasm
with which he opposed the Serbian lobby.  Although there were films shown
about other revolutionaries, it became clear to me that that particular
film will never be shown on TV.  The Serbs who rulled the Bosnian state TV
would nev er allowe something like that in favor of Bosnian statehood to
be broadcasted. It turned out I was right.  Soon after the death of Dzemal
Bijedic, the powerful Serbian lobby in Bosnia-Hercegovina tried to
discredit and remove Mr. Hamdija Pozderc, who was also devoted to Republic
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Todays Chetnik supreme leader (Vojvoda) and the
then professor at the College of Political Science in Sarajevo, Dr.
Vojislav Seselj, ha s learned that one of the students of Mr. Pozderac,
copied (plagiarized) parts of his dissertation, but was not punished for
it by Mr. Pozderac.  Because the student Brano Miljus, has raised to a
very high position within the Central Committee of the comm unist party, a
big controversy was born, whose goal was the removal from power of
Mr.Hamdija Pozderac.  However, at that time (1979), Mr. Pozderac succeed
in defending himself and it was Seselj who had to leave Sarajevo.  What
surfaced during that period was the revelation as to what really protects
Seselj; the national affirmation of the "Bosnian Muslims", whose
nationality was recognized in 1970, and the ever growing independence of
Bosnia-Hercegovina.  Seselj pointed his finger at "Muslim nationalists
within the Central Committee of the Bosnian Communist Party.  I will
mention a few of them: Mr. Hamdija Pozderac, Hasan Grabcanovic, Dr. Atif
Purivatra, Dr. Fuad Muhic, etc... They enabled to authors like Dr. Muhamed
Hadzijahic, Muhsin Rizvic, Dr. Kasim Suljevic, Dr. Hamdija Cemerlic etc...
to publish their papers and books in which it has been proven that the
"Bosnian Muslims" exist as a separate ethnic group, i.e. that they are not
neither Serbs nor Croats of Muslim faith. The influential Serbian lobby
did not allow "Bosnian Muslims" to have their traditional ethnic name
"Bosnjak", at that time. 

During the Spring of 1983, a group of so called "Muslim Nationalists" was
arrested in Sarajevo. The trial lasted the entire summer and the sentences
were draconian. Among the accused were Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, Omer Behmen,
Hasan Cengic, Edhem Bicakic and Dzemaludin Latic.  At that time I was
confused by the fact that during the trial of those Muslims, the most
active cooperation with the prosecutors came from Hamdija Pozderac and Dr.
Fuad Muhic, men who were accused by Seselj as being the "flower of Mus lim
nationalism and who were proven Bosnian patriots.  (Namely, the so called
political trails were initiated by government during the communist rule.)
Many Bosnjaks were convinced that they were witnessing "Bosnian Muslim"
communists trying Muslim belie vers and that they were playing in to the
hands of the powerful Serbian lobby in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  (The term
"Bosnian Muslim Communist" is not contradictory because "Bosnian Muslims"
was the official ethnic, not a religious, designation, hence, it was
possible to have communists among the ethnic group of Bosnian Muslims.)
That attitude separated Pozderac from many Bosnjaks and also made him very
vulnerable.  That vulnerability will resurface again when the Serbian
clique tries again to remove from pow er Pozderc's friends and followers,
during the "Agrokomerc Affair.", which will be described later in this
chapter. 

The Serbian propaganda insisted that Bosnia was a "dark nation" where all
those who oppose the government will be persecuted and prosecuted,
referring to the earlier Sarajevo trials, where "Bosnian Muslim"
communists were prosecuting Muslim belivers.  Tha t kind of propaganda
attracted many "Bosnian Muslims" to their way of thinking.  Those who knew
that Pozderac was a true Bosnian patriot were interpreting the "Sarajevo
trial" as his way of removing the political amateurs who could end up
disrupting the p rocess of Bosnian independence.  At that time, no one
could imagine that there could be Muslims willing to partition Bosnia that
that was the reason for those Muslims being prosecuted by Pozderac's
government.  It was well known that partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina has
always been the Serbian goal, but it was inconceivable that there could be
Muslim in Bosnia who had interests similar to those.  No one even noticed
that Izetbegovic's book, "Islamic Declaration" was published by the
Belgrade publishing house "Srpska rec" (Serbian Word), an unabashed Cetnik
(Serbian extremists) business, and also that it was Seselj, the Serbian
leader, who circulated petitions to have the "Muslim intellectuals"
released from prisons.  At Seselj's initiative, even leftist leaning group
of European pfilosopher from the so called Korcula School took a stand and
protected the "Islamic Intellectuals."  No one among the Bosnjaks (a.k.a.
Bosnian Muslims) paid attention to the fact that Izetbegovic kept
repeating during the trial that in his Islamic Declaration he wasn't
thinking about Bosnia-Hercegovina but about some other state in which the
Muslims would be 80% of population. Much later in 1993, when he returned
form Geneva, where he just signed the Tudjman/Milosevic plan of "union of
three Bosnias" did Alija Izetbegovic declare that the Muslims will get a
state in which t hey will be approximately 80% of the population.  It was
only then that it became clear which state he had in mind when talking
about a state with 80% Muslims in his Islamic Declaration.  It became
clear and obvious that Alija Izetbegovic always wanted a nd worked for the
division of Bosnia-Hercegovina.  It became clear why did Pozderac
prosecuted and Seselj supported Izetbegovic.  Partitioning of Bosnia in
order to create a smaller "Islamic" state was in the best Serbian
interest. In all of this Pozderac committed a grave error.  Thinking that
he removed Izetbegovic from political life by putting him away for 14
years, he didn't explain well enough to the Bosnian people who is Alija
Izetbegovic or that he was really helping the Serbs and that Izetbegovic
's goal was the division of Bosnia.  Later, when during the "Agrokomerc "
affair the Serbs removed Pozderac's followers and when Izetbegovic was
released from prison ahead of time, Izetbegovic emerged with the laurels
of anti communist and a "Muslim," a v ictim of communism.  That enabled
Izetbegovic to emerge as the leader of the "Bosnian Muslims" during the
crucial period in Bosnia's history, but more importantly, it enabled him
to start the creation oh his long time dream, the "Little Bosnia."  It
didn' t bother him that by creating his reduced version of Bosnia, he also
made it possible for the Serbs to create a separate state of "Republika
Srpska," carved out of the state of Bosnia, which was recognized by
Izetbegovic and Sacirbay on September 8, 1995 in Geneva. He pretends that
he is creating an Islamic state. In fact he is creating a Serbian state
and his small Emirate, which he calls "Bosnia". In order to reach those
two goals he is giving a peace of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to
Croats. 

But let's return to the "Sarajevo process" of 1983.  In the trial
transcripts, there are some unquestionable proofs that some of his
accusers were those whose interest was the preservation of a unified
Bosnia, or as he calls them "the narrow minded and lo calized
aspirations."  Here is a quote from the final speech by Mr. Izetbegovic
from August 16, 1983, during the "Sarajevo" process: 

        "In conclusion, I would like to say that I didn't do any harm to
the Yugoslav state.  The harm was done by those who initialed this
process.  These narrow minded and localized aspirations have already
brought some heavy damage to this country (Yugoslavia).  That happened as
the result of this case.  This process was initiated only by those who can
see no further than the local interest. 

While on the subject of Yugoslavia, I can only say that I loved it as much
as one can love his homeland.  I loved even the way it looks on the map." 

Let us remember the Serbian terminology of those days, when "those who are
narrow minded can't see further from their thresholds, and when they
contribute to the disintegration of Yugoslavia". 

Even Milosevic would be proud of such (Izetbegovic's) jargon.

Here, I have to digress a little.  We can see that such code phrases were
used long before Milosevic assumed power. Dr. Nenad Kecmanovic, one of the
most devious politicians among the Serbs at that time, was the first to
"arm" his fellow Serbs with such ph rases and slogans.  Actually, even
before Tito's death 1980, Dr. Kecmanovic started writing articles for the
Serbian paper NIN, in which he started to dissect and discredit the last
Yugoslav constitution from 1974.  In this series of articles that were pu
blished for several years, he started to introduce the new, Serbian
political terminology.  He coined such phrases as "national oglyarhy" (to
describe states governments), "autarkic economies" (to describe the
different states economies), "the narrow mind ed localized views (in
describing local and states interests), "own domain" (for ones own
Republic/state) and so on.  With those articles, Dr.  Kecmanovic became
one of the key people in the Serbian nationalistic awakening, which as
always, ends in the ge nocide against their neighbors, Albanians, Croats
and Bosnjaks.  It is not true that it was Milosevic who has reawakened
Serbian nationalism.  Just the opposite is true, once their nationalist
passions were awakened, it was the Serbs who chose a leader th at fit
their needs. 

It would be also interesting to note that it was Dr. Kecmanovic who hired
Seselj at the "Political School" of the Sarajevo University and that he
protected Seselj during the laters attack on the Bosnian leadership.  All
that did not prevent Izetbegovic fr om accepting Dr. Nenad Kecmanovic to
become a member of Bosnian Presidency in the war, until he escaped to
Serbia. 

                   "THE AGROKOMERC AFFAIR"

The "Agrokomerc" matter started in 1988. when it was published that large
amounts of non-covered and worthless checks and promissory notes were
issued by the "Agrokomerc" company from Velika Kladusa.  In fact those
notes were covered by the company's prop erty in domestic animals. The
"Agrokomerc" setup started when the Belgrade "independent" daily "Borba"
published that Agrokomerc promissory notes are not valid. Suddenly nobody
wanted to sell food for the animals. That caused the deaths of millions of
ani mals within a couple of weeks. Then the Agrokomerc promissory notes
really become worthless. The fact that its director, Mr. Fikret Abdic, was
placed to that position by Mr. Hakija Pozderac, a brother of the Bosnian
leader Hamdija Pozderac, was used by th e protagonists of the
"anti-bureaucratic revolution" as a weapon to expel the followers of Mr.
Pozderac from any leadership positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
("Anti-bureaucratic revolution" is a movement of Serbian masses who
illegally, under the pressure of demonstrations and setups such as
"Agrokomerc Affair", removed uncooperative leaders of non-Serb ethnic
groups from power.) During the conflict with the Bosnian patriots, many
members of the Bosnian bureaucracy were used, of whom most had Muslim
names and supposedly represented the Bosnian Muslim interests in Bosnia
but in fact were only interested in their own well being and wealth.  They
completely forgot about the people they came from.  Their homeland was
Yugoslavia (instead of Bosnia-Herzegovina ) and their only motivation in
life was their own best interest.  Those were the people who only took
sides after it was clear who is the winner, and once they sided with the
winner, they helped him to "finish off" the victim.  Mr. Hamdija Pozderac
made a crucial mistake when he resigned his future position as the head of
the Constitutional commission of Yugoslavia.  He knew that his position
and function would bother the Serbs , who wanted to change the
constitution of Yugoslavia and return of a strong c entral government
(Unitarians).  He thought that by removing himself from the "Yugoslav
scene" he would be left alone in Bosnia.  However, by resigning, he showed
weakness, which all the scavengers with Muslim names, but Yugoslavia at
heart, turned agains t him and his followers.  Usually a men doesn't
remember these insignificant participants, so even I only remember three
of them: Nijaz Dizdarevic, Raif Dizdarevic and Seid Maglajlija.  On the
other (Bosnian patriotic) side, there were in addition to Mr.  Hamdija
Pozderac; Munir Mesihovic, Ferhad Kotoric, Avdo Campara, Hakija Pozderac,
Sadi Cemalovic, Jole Musa, Fikret Abdic, just to mention a few.  These
patriots are some of the people removed from high positions in the Bosnian
government during the time of "Agrokomerc" affair and the
"anti-bureaucratic revolution."  There were several young and well
educated Bosnian politicians who surfaced on the political scene during
that period: Dr. Fuad Muhic, Muhamed Abadzic, Nijaz Skenderagic, Fatima
Zubovic and E dina Residovic, the prosecutor form the "Sarajevo process"
in 1983.  It is interesting to note that except for Skenderagic and
Residovic, all others offered their support to the SDA (Izetbegovic)
government.  They didn't do that as a carrier move but beca use they saw
what peril awaits Bosnians.  If they were only interested in their
carriers, during the "Agrokomerc affair", they would have sided with Milan
Uzelac, Savo Cecur, the evil Miroslav Jancic, Milanko Renovica and other
protagonists of the "anti-b ureaucratic" revolution, as was done by Raif
and Nijaz Dizdarevic and Seid Maglajlija.  As opposed to the SDS (Serbian
political party) and the HDZ (Croatian political party), who gladly
accepted all the ex-communists in to their ranks, the SDA (mostly Bo snian
Muslim political party) didn't accept all, but only a few chosen ones,
whose criterion was characterized by a statement from Mr. Izetbegovic at
the party's second Congress in 1994: "It is better to choose those who are
honest than those who are capa ble."  When you observe the behavior of his
current collaborators, such as Dr. Kasim Trnku, Dzemaludin Latic, Edhem
Bicakic, Kemo Muftic (and others), you will notice that the part of his
"motto" that says "honest" actually means completely obedient. 

After the "Agrokomerc" affair, the things started changing fast.  The
Bosnian Constitution was changed in order to facilitate free elections in
Bosnia.  Alija Izetbegovic and his followers were easily released from
jail.  Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic, the leading Bosnian decedent to communist
role, talked about that: "two days after Izetbegovic's release from prison
he was in Zurih visiting me.  I remember that during the 1983 trial he
lost all of his civil and constitutional rights and that these rights can
not be restored without the due process.  When I asked Izetbegovic how did
he get a passport so fast, his answer was "oh, they just gave it to me"." 
If one is familiar with the situation in Bosnia at that time, and when one
knows who can issue a passport on such short notice, (namely, the police
that was completely under Serbian control), the question arises: "Who is
Alija Izetbegovic?"  Why would the Serbs facilitates the creation of a
"Muslim" political organization (SDA)?  Our suspicions increase when we
remember the statement made by Karadzic just before the elections: "If
Durakovic is elected, there is going to be war, if Izetbegovic is elected
we'll negotiate." (Dr. Nijaz Durakovic was a leader of the Socialist Party
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.)

Today, after all of "peace" proposals that Izetbegovic signed so far have
gone a long way towards legalizing all of the Serbian "ethnic cleansing" 
it is clear that Karadzic needed Izetbegovic, primarily so that he could
conduct the war more successfully, specifically, so he could have someone
in the opposing camp who would with his signatures legalize the conquered
territories.  There was a clear attempt by the communist organizations in
the predominantly Serbian parts of Bosnia, to neutralize Dr. Nijaz D
urakovic before the elections.  In other words, those patriotic Bosniaks
who could gain in popularity had to be silenced in order to insure
Izetbegovic's assuming the title as the head of all the Bosnjaks.
Izetbegovic's political party, the SDA was established on March 27, 1990.
That certainly was a surprise.  Under the laws in force at that time,
every participant of that organization could have received ten years in
prison.  Besides, to the large majority of Bosnians, who were brought up
in the spirit of "brotherhood and unity," the subject of ethnicity was
"tabu" in public relations.  As opposed to the Serbs, the Bosnjaks didn't
have strong sense of ethnic or national belonging.  Even the Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina contained their ethnic and nationalistic sentiments, at
least in public.  That is why it seamed unbelievable to see 40 Bosnian
Muslim men and women as they sat in front of TV cameras as proof that it
was the Muslims who were the first to initiate the division along ethnic
lines in Bosnia.  That was a strong point in favor of the Serbs.  From
that moment on, a whole series of unusual and strange events took place.
Although the SDA was several months away from being registered, from that
moment on, the meetings and conventions of the local branches of the SDA
were not stopped anywhere in Bosnia, except in Travnik.  In the most
beautiful hall of the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo, the constitutional
convention was held on June 9, 1990.  Izetbegovic's people freely carried
green (Muslim) flags throughout eastern Hercegovina, Majevica, Grmec and
in many other places where Muslims were in the past attacked or even
killed for transgressions much smaller than the green flag.  It was clear
that the creators of the "anti-bureaucratic" revolt allowed Izetbegovic and 
his followers to create a lot of attention for themselves and emerge at
the "head" of Bosnjaks.  I suppose that Izetbegovic had that honor because
in the "Islamic Declaration" he wrote that Pakistan was our "general" 
rehearsal.  With that statement, he acknowledged that he agrees to huge
shifts and transfers of population in order to divide the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina along the ethnic lines.  Those ideas were started to
get promoted publicly just before the 1990 elections by protagonists of
the Greater Serbia project.

My first encounter with Izetbegovic took place several days prior to the
referendum on Bosnia's independence, at the end of February of 1992.  That
happened at the meeting in the amphitheater of the Sarajevo city ward of
"Old Town."  The meeting was calle d with only one item on the agenda,
"preparations for the upcoming referendum."  Every Bosnian county chapter
president and secretary were invited. I was the president of the "public
relations" department of the Tuzla chapter (and not Actually invited), b
ut I was sent in place of the president Dr. Salih Kulenovic, who had
another engagement that evening.  The "cream" of the SDA party was present
at that meeting.  The reason for the meeting (preparations for the
referendum) was taken care of quickly.  Tha t part of the agenda was taken
care of by good organizers Mr. Hasan Cengic and Ms. Amila Omersoftic.  It
wasn't planed for Izetbegovic to appear at that meeting.  We were all
pleasantly surprised when we were informed that Izetbegovic would like to
addres s the meeting.  Dr. Ejup Ganic, a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
Presidency, accompanied him.  Izetbegovic addressed us with approximately
these words: "Maybe we will be asked to negotiate the internal division of
Bosnia-Hercegovina in to ethnic Cantons.  Maybe it wouldn't be so bad to
define those areas where the Muslims are in the majority.  That doesn't
mean that there would be a major shift in population, only that those
Cantons with the predominantly Muslim population would be called Muslims,
those with predominantly Serbian population would be called Serbian and
of course, those with a Croatian majority would be called Croatian.  I
would like to hear your thoughts on that."  The delegates spoke one by
one, and it became clear that majority of them wasn't interested in
accepting any partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The delegate from Gacko
was the clearest on the subject, I think his name was Bajro Greljo, who
said: "Let's not fool ourselves.  If Gacko was proclaimed a Serbian
Canton, there wouldn 't be a single Muslim left there."  The only one who
supported Izetbegovic's suggestion was the delegate from Gracanica.  It
might have been because the Bosnian Muslims were over 80% of its
population.  I also got the floor.  I told the delegates that under no
circumstances should there be borders dividing Bosnia.  If they are drawn,
Bosnia would eventually be divided along those lines, just as Yugoslavia
disintegrated.  Hearing those words, Eljup Ganic turned and approvingly
shook his head.  I concluded at that time that Ganic was a true Bosnian
patriot and I didn't suspect him of any wrong doing for a long time.  At
the end of the meeting, realizing that he couldn't get the consensus to
his idea on the division, Izetbegovic used the mentality of the "Little"
people who are always in the majority but don't want to confront the
authorities, to get permission to at least negotiate with the Serbs, but
not to agree on anything.  The idea of the negotiations was to "buy time." 
Although I didn't agree with the negotiations, they could be justified by
the fact that we were unarmed compared to the Yugoslav Army, so we needed  
every day to arm ourselves.
 
Besides, up to that point, the Serbs and the Croats haven't committed any
atrocities against the Muslims yet, so the negotiations didn't seem so far
out of line, out of dignity.  In that context, we can't begrudge Adil
Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Filipovic, the leaders of the Muslim Bosnjak
Organization (MBO) for the so called historical agreement between the
Serbs and the Muslims.  It also bought some time. We won't go in to the
details of this agreement which Bosnian people refused.  It was described
in more detail in the book by Milovan Djilas and Nadezde Gace "Bosnjak
Adil Zulfikarpasic," Globus and the Bosnjak institute, 1994.  I recommend
that book because it describes many of the events taking place during the
same times.

              THE FIRST CONGRESS OF THE SDA

I received my invitation to the first Congress of the SDA from Ms. Amila
Omersoftic, the then member of the Central Committee of the SDA, later the
wartime director of the Bosnian Radio and television.  She has tried
earlier to start an action of connecti ng of the Bosnjak intellectuals
with the SDA party.  She noticed that there weren't enough members since
Adil Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Filipovic left the SDA, taking with them
their own local committees.  The action of enroling new intellectual
members w as stopped by Izetbegovic himself by handing over the membership
affairs to a cleric, Hasan Cengic.  Amila couldn't accept the rejection of
intellectuals at such a crucial moment of the Bosnian history.  That is
why she sent the invitations to the First C ongress (of SDA) hoping that
some new intellectuals would influence the SDA. 

All those attending will remember that congress because of the fighting
between Izetbegovic and Fikret Abdic.  I realized back then that Abdic
wasn't a very clever politician.  Izetbegovic played with him like with a
little child.  But Abdic didn't know when he has had enough, so he kept
trying until he completely lost any stature he held with the SDA. 

I took part in the work of the Commission for economic questions.  By that
time, Croatia and Slovenia have already introduced their own currency and
they had huge amounts of unusable Yugoslav Dinars.  Besides that, Belgrade
was still printing huge amounts of Dinars also.  These worthless dinars
were being spent in Bosnia for the purchase of German Marks and many of
the goods manufactured in Bosnia.  I decided to initiate that question at
the SDA Congress.  On a piece of paper I turned in to the commission, in
addition to my name, I also explained what the question was going to be
about.  The president of the commission was the Minister of Industry for
the state of Bosnia, Dr. Resad Bektic and the vice president was Dr. Hasan
Muratovic, later, during the war known as the minister of the Bosnian
government in charge of the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Forces)
relations.  Because I was siting in the front row, I noticed that Dr.
Muratovic upon seeing the subject that I wanted to address, placed my
request on the top.  However, when the president of the commission, Bektic
read my note, and when he was supposed to call on me to present my
concern, he quietly took my slip and placed it on the bottom.  I became
upset and created an incident.  Later I did get the opportunity to speak. 
At that moment, continuing to use the Yugoslav Dinar as the official
currency was only beneficial to the Serbia.  The behavior by Bektic could
have only been indicative of a Serbian supporter.  That day I was watching
on TV news that delegates to the other Commissions were also demanding the
introduction of a Bosnian currency.  The proof that I was right and that
that was a crucial question in Bosnia-Hercegovina was the fact that all
those delegates requesting the introduction of Bosnian currency were given
wide media exposure.  However, Izetbegovic didn't pay attention to any of
that.  Bosnian currency was introduced much later, during the war.  At the
time I thought that Izetbegovic simply didn't realize the importance of
the question of currency for a newly independent state.  However, from
some of Izetbegovic's statement it was clear that he was very intelligent
and well informed, so I couldn't understand his reluctance to introduction
of Bosnia's own currency.  That really did confuse me, but I do admit that
at that time I didn't yet realize that even Izetbegovic was working
against Bosnia-Hercegovina, and that that was the reason there was room at
the SDA leadership level for people like Bektic. 


                          The end of the second part

[END OF PART TWO]

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