The War in Bosnia - part three

                  CHAPTER 3

              HOW YUGOSLAVIA DIED

                  Federation

Yugoslavia was a federation composed of six states (starting from the
North - West): Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro
and Macedonia.  The largest of the six states, Serbia, also contained two
(at one time) autonomous regions, Vojv odina on the north and Kosova on
the south.  Those two regions were "awarded " to Serbia by France and
England at the end of W.W.I (1914-1918) as reward for Serbia's
cooperation.  The reason that those two region were autonomous within
Serbia was that the Serbian population in them historicaly was a minority,
and Vojvodina was never even a part of Serbia before the W.W.I.  The
majority of population in Vojvodina were Catholics: Croats, Hungarians,
Romanians Czech, Slovaks, Germans, Serbs and a few others.  The Serbs only
started becoming majority of population during W.W.II, when they
exterminated many of the Catholic people and colonized Vojvodina with
hundreds of thousands of Serbs from economically undeveloped regions of
ex-Yugoslavia.  Albanians are s till over 80% of Kosovo population.  Every
republic and both of the autonomous regions had their Presidency,
government and Parliament.  In addition, each republic and autonomuous
region had independent judiciary system, police, school system, mail servi
ce and the rail roads. 

                The Yugoslav National Army and the Territorial defense

It is very close to the truth when stating that of all the "Federal"
institutions in Yugoslavia, only the Army was totally federal and under a
single control and not divided and influenced by the state lines.  Besides
the federal Army in Yugoslavia, there was also the territorial defense,
which somewhat resembled the American "National Guard."  Every Republic
(state) had control over its own territorial defense.  Since the
territorial defense had its own arsenal, it would be reasonable to say
that such te rritorial defense units were in fact states army.  The
weapons for those territorial units were purchased by the local companies
and republic governments. 

With the development and maintenance of such units, Tito's goal of a true
peoples army and defense was realized.  Although Tito justified the
concept of the Territorial Defense by stating that such an all inclusive
force was needed to fend off an external attack, he had a different goal
in mind.  He was more concerned with the Serbian expansionism within
Yugoslavia.  By creating the Territorial Defense Tito enabled every
republic to protect itself of Yugoslav Army, that was controlled by Serbs.
The conce pt of such territorial defense was totally successful in
Slovenia and completely useless in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Unfortunately,
Alija Izetbegovic did not offer any resistance to the Serbian disarming of
the Bosnian Territorial Defense forces.  Bosnjaks su rrendered all of
their weapons to the Serbian dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) a
short time before the Serbs committed the latest genocide over the Bosnian
people.  For example, many of us still remember when the Cetniks hauled
away some 50 truckloads of weapons from the old center of Sarajevo at the
beginning of the war. 
                                                     26 Although the total
command of the JNA was completely centralized on the federal level, the
recruiting was done on the local, usually county, level.  That meant that
the lists of the potential recruiting candidates were in the hands of the
local government s.  That fact was one of the crucial decisions involving
the future of Yugoslavia.  For example, during the war in Croatia,
Macedonia used its constitutional right and made a decision that the
counties should remove (hide) from the JNA all the recruiting candidates
lists.  That is how it happened that Kiro Gligorov (Macedonian's leader)
succeeded in preventing the recruiting and sending to the Croatian "front"
young Macedonians.  But the government of Alija Izetbegovic refused to do
the same for Bosnia-He rzegovina (R BH).  I remember when Tuzla's members
of the Muslim intellectuals society "Preporod" (rebirth) met in an effort
to contact Izetbegovic so they could ask from him to do the same for his
people that Gligorov has done for Macedonians.  I persona lly went to the
SDA (Izetbegovic's political party) headquarters and together with the
party's secretary contacted Osman Brka, who immediately forwarded the
Tuzla's request to Izetbegovic.  Izetbegovic made an appearance on the TV
news that evening.  Inst ead of using his constitutional right in ordering
to local governments to remove the list of recruits the JNA access, he
only said: "Some (people) notified me that the JNA is mobilizing Muslims
in order to send them to the Croatian front.  My message to t he Muslims
is that I wouldn't send my son to serve in the Yugoslav army."  That was
one more sample of betrayal of the BiH constitution.  The JNA used the
fact that those lists weren't removed and in a lightning action came in to
possession of them, thus giving them the necessary information to induct
young Bosnians.  Every young men from R BH who was recruited from that
point on is the responsibility and the fault of Alija Izetbegovic. 

There were a few places where by the simple reaction of the local people,
those list were hidden and kept away from the JNA.  I remember the grand
meeting in Bratunac where the JNA was prevented from acquiring those lists
from the county.  The embarrassed JNA withdrew, but it returned in April
of 1992 and took revenge for the earlier embarrassment and slaughtered
those present at the earlier meeting.  The stadium and the gymnasium in
Bratunac became known for the brutality, carnage and massacre that the
Serbs committed there.  Even in Tuzla, the mothers tried to prevent the
removal of the recruiting lists.  A strong resistance was also given by
the head of the military district, Mehmed Zilic.  Only when the soldiers
of the JNA pointed their guns at him did he give them those lists.  What
followed was the wholesale recruiting of young Bosnians for the Serbian
war in Croatia, especially the drivers, who were lead by force in to
Croatia, instead of being protected by their own Bosnian government, which
had the constitutional right to remove those lists from the access to the
JNA. Only after the JNA came in to possession of the R BH recruiting lists
was there an announcement by the SDA (Alija Izetbegovic) to the local
governments to organize demonstrations.  It is obvious that these protest
meetings didn't have any effect except to show that Izetbegovic was
"upset" about the JNA taking these lists and with that trouncing the
constitution of R BH.  To those of us who knew that Izetbegovic refused to
protect those lists, it became obvious that Izetbegovic was just trying to
fool the Bosnians in order to cover up one more of his "mistakes."  But
even then I still didn't realize that all of his actions were just a part
of the elaborate plot of his betrayal of R BH.
                                        
Maybe someone will wonder how come no one started to suspect any wrong
going on the part of Izetbegovic, even after that many mistakes.  The
answer is simple.  Man simply has to believe someone.  One has trouble
suspecting his own president of betrayal, a nd besides, men must have hope
and faith in people in order to survive. 

               The Assembly, Presidency and the Government of Yugoslavia

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had its Presidency, Assembly
and Government.  The Presidency was composed of eight members, one from
each of the states plus one from each of the autonomous regions (Vojvodina
and Kosova).  There were also two houses of Parliament, the Federal House
and the House of Republics and (Autonomous) Regions.  In the Federal House
, the decisions were made by a simple majority vote.  In the House of the
Republics and Regions, decisions regarding the equality of States and
people were reached by consensus.  This last fact was of tremendous
importance in the ending of Yugoslavia.  We will be referring to it later. 

There are many examples in the modern world that show that disintegration
and the disappearance of a modern state is almost impossible.  Lebanon,
Iraq, Afghanistan, Estonia or Cambodia are all states that didn't
disappear despite the fact that many of th em have been occupied for a
long time or that there were conflicts and long wars between the different
groups living there.  What is that doesn't allow for a disappearance of a
country?  It is the principles of the international laws that prevent a
disin tegration.  By those principles of the International law, the
borders of a country can't be changed by force, that is, the world can not
recognize borders changed by the use of force.  That principle of the
International law was introduced in order to dis courage eventual
aggressors.  A country's borders can only be changed by the agreement of
the concerned legal authorities.  Lebanon wasn't divided in to different
religious states because none of the Lebanese presidents were willing to
break their oath o f presidency and start negotiating the changing of
their country's borders or even the total division.  Now a question
arises: How was it then possible for Yugoslavia to come apart?  Yugoslavia
"fell apart" because even without war it couldn't function LE GALY any
longer.  In other words, within the legal framework of the Yugoslav
Constitution, it became impossible for any decisions to be made at the
federal level.  When Slovenia and Croatia withdrew their delegations from
the House of the Republices and t he Regions, a permanent veto was
instituted in to that Assembly body.  The only constitutional solution to
that crisis was a declaration of State of war.  However, the presidency
has already lost four of its eight legally elected members: Janez Drnovsek
(Slovenia), Stjepan Mesic (Croatia), Bosko Krunic (Vojvodina) and Riza
Sapundjiju (Kosova).  Bosko Krunic (Vojvodina) was replaced by Branko
Kostic and Riza Sapundjiju (Kosovo) was replaced by Sejdo Bajramovic. 
However, the world did not recognize thei r legality as members of the
Yugoslav Presidency.  That is why the Yugoslav Presidency couldn't make
any legal decision and, hence, couldn't declare State of War.  The point
is that after the collapse of the House of the Republics and Regions, even
the Pr esidency couldn't save Yugoslavia. 

Because Milosevic understood that due to crumbling of the House of the
Republics and Regions, Yugoslavia would soon be declared "dead" by the
world's community, he did all he could to insure that at least the
disintegration happens along the lines and new borders favorable to the
Serbs. In reality, that meant that in this new Serbian dominated entity
there would also be the Montenegro, R BH, Macedonia and a large part of
Croatia.  In that regard, he encouraged the Slovenians to leave
(Yugoslavia) as soon as possible, "the sooner the better." 

The United Nations (UN) gave a mandate to the European Community (EC) in
1990 to (according to the international laws) resolve the Yugoslav
constitutional crisis.  Due to the fact that the Federal government of
Yugoslavia didn't function but the States (R epublics) did, the
"Europeans" demanded that the states come to some sort of agreement on a
new constitution.  That is why towards the end of 1990 and the beginning
of 1991, meetings were called between the Presidents of the Republics and
the Regions.  At these negotiations, the representatives of Croatia,
Slovenia and Macedonia insisted on a confederation of the Yugoslav states,
while Serbia and Montenegro wanted a federation (a much stronger central
government, more favorable to the Serbs).  Actually, they too (Serbia and
Montenegro) really wanted the collapse of Yugoslavia, since after the 1974
constitution, Yugoslavia stopped being the "Great Serbia". The problem was
that they wanted to change borders of the Republics in order to form
"Greater Serbia ". Serbs also wanted to be recognised as ancestors of
ex-Yugoslavia.  The President of R BH Presidency was behaving very
strangely during all this negotiations.  It was known that two thirds of
Bosnians wanted separation and independence (from Yugoslavia) , or a loose
confederation.  All of the Bosnjaks (Muslims) and Croats wanted
independence.  That was later proven during a referendum on independence
held on March 1, 1992.  However, Izetbegovic was coming out with some very
strange proposals.  One of th em was an "asymmetrical" federation. 
According to him, that meant that Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and BH
would constitute the federation, which would then enter in a loose
con-federation with Croatia and Slovenia.  That meant he placed BH and
Maced onia under the control of a "Greater Serbia."  Fortunately, in R BH
at that time existed unrestricted public opinion, which strongly
criticized Izetbegovic for that suggestion.  He was forced to spend many
days defending himself from that suggestion.  He learned that any move to
place BH in to the Serbian sphere of influence could cost him his
popularity, maybe even his position.  The best proof that he has learned
his lesson was reported in the book by Milovan Djilas and Nada Gace:
"Bosnjak Adil Zulfikar pasic," where from Zulfikarpasic's conversation
with Izetbegovic regarding the so called "Historical accord between the
Muslims and the Serbs" have shown that it was Izetbegovic who influenced
Zulfikarpasic to reach the "accord" with Milosevic".  Hiding b ehind Adil
Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Filipovic, Izetbegovic again tried to realize
his project of connecting BH with Serbia, without sacrificing his own
popularity but that of the leaders of the MBO party. 

Let's return to the Izetbegovic's suggestion of an "asymmetrical
federation."  When introduced to that suggestion, Macedonian president
Kiro Gligorov rejected it outright,even though Izetbegovic introduced it
as joint Izetbegovic/Gligorov project.  The question is asked: "if
Izetbegovic didn't get an agreement from Gligorov for such a motion, why
did Izetbegovic propose something like that for Macedonia?  Why would a
Bosni an try to push Macedonia in to the "Greater Serbia?"  There is only
one answer possible:  Izetbegovic wasn't concerned with the well-being of
R BH but that of the "Greater Serbia." 

The third attempt by Izetbegovic to deliver BH to the Serbs was attempted
with the help of the pre-war member of the Yugoslav federation Irfan
Ajanovic.  Irfan Ajanovic was an important ally of Izetbegovic from before
the war.  Once a relative of Ajanovi c, a Dr. Ekrem Ajanovic, Professor of
the medical school at the University of Tuzla and a representative at both
the R BH Assembly and at the Yugoslav one, told me that Irfan Ajanovic was
"sacrificed by Izetbegovic in order to be able to give strange and unusual
recommendations for tactical reasons."  Irfan Ajanovic is a prisoner of
Karadzic since the Spring of 1993.  Since then, there were many
negotiations an meetings between Izetbegovic and Karadzic on many
different subjects but never about Karadzic's prisoner, Irfan Ajanovic. 
So many of Izetbegovic's "diplomats" went undisturbed through the Serbian
lines, but an ex vice president of the Yugoslav Assembly is languishing in
Serbian jails, even though in poor health.  Looking from the morality
point o f view, Izetbegovic's negotiations with Karadzic while an
Izetbegovic's man is in Karadzic's prison points to the total moral
bankruptcy of Izetbegovic.  Knowing that Izetbegovic isn't that stupid and
that he wouldn't risk his reputation without a good re ason, the question
arises: why didn't Izetbegovic insist on freedom for Ajanovic? 

Let's return to Izetbegovic's "tactical" proposal to the Federal Assembly
by the way of Irfan Ajanovic.  The proposal by Irfan Ajanovic was that the
Yugoslav Assembly makes a decision to define a new quorum without Croatia
and Slovenija in the House of th e Republics and Regions, and that a
simple majority would be enough to render any decisions.  All those who
followed the Yugoslav political scene new that since the days of Rankovic,
( a Serbian polititian who tried to owerthrow Tito in 1966 in order to
form the Greater Serbia) that was always the desire of the "Unitarists"
(Unionists), that is the Serbs.  It was the possibility of a veto in the
House of the Republics and Regions that kept the Serbs from total control
of Yugoslavia. 

That proposal that favored the Serbian control of Yugoslavia raised many
suspicions about Izetbegovic, unfortunately, these suspicions were related
to his ability as the president and not his loyalty to, or the betrayal of
R BH.  It is unfortunate that no ne of the Bosnian people panicked after
so many "mistakes" in favor of "Greater Serbia."  There were those who
believed that it was all about some clever tactic which simple mortals
couldn't understand., some thought that Izetbegovic was too naive for pol
itics, but they hoped the others from the government will "correct" him in
the future.  No one saw a reason to worry that every time Izetbegovic was
"corrected," it was done by the way of the public media and opinion.  That
fact also determined the tactic of the future war against the statehood of
R BH.  It became clear that without eliminating the free media, there wou
ld be no possibility of destroying the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
that is, it would be impossible to get an agreement from the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina to change its borders and the Constitution.  Just so he
could eliminate freedom of the press and control the public opinion, and
so that Izetbegovic and a few of his followers are the only ones who have
the authority to decide the future of BH during the war time, a t otal
informative blackade was introduced, not only from Bosnians enemies from
outside, but also from Izetbegovic inside of BH.  The people of the BH
Army Second Corps know that Izetbegovic issued the order NOT to install
the wireless telephone service fro m Tuzla.  The equipment was donated by
Germany soon after May 15, 1992, a day when Tuzla was liberated, and it
could have connected Tuzla to the outside world, had it not been for an
order from Izetbegovic not to allow the equipment in from Slavonski Brod
(Croatia).  I can mention this particular case because I have an eye
witness to this event, Colonel Sefcet Bibuljica, of the BH Army.  There
are others who talk of Izetbegovic interrupting the progress on
constructing satellite TV for Sarajevo. 

Let's return to the problem of the disappearance of Yugoslavia.  In
addition to the already mentioned Izetbegovic's attempts to annex BH to
Serbia during the series of negotiations between the chiefs of the six
Yugoslav Sates, nothing significant happened .  When the negotiations
became useless, "Europeans"  formed a commission of legal experts , the so
called "Badinter" commission, whose goal was to resolve the Yugoslav
crisis according to the principles of the international laws.  The
commission didn't h ave a very difficult task.  All of the Yugoslav States
kept all of the States institutions and under their laws, these were
defined as states, Actually, countries.  Considering that Slovenia and
Croatia also held their referendums on their independence an d considering
that Yugoslavia could no longer make any legitimate decisions, which means
it was declared dead, those two States could have immediately been
recognized as independent.  As far as R BH is concerned, the opinion of
the Badinter's commission w as that it too could be recognized as
independent if the majority of its inhabitants declare so in a referendum
to be conducted according to the R BH constitution.  Knowing that R BH
constitution didn't differentiate between the different ethnic groups, i n
order for the referendum on R BH independence to succeed, it was necessary
to only have 50% of Bosnians plus one (person).  The referendum was held
on March 1, and 2, 1992.  The voter participation was exceptionally high,
over 64% voters chose independe nce.  Regardless the fact that Muslims are
only 43% and Croatians 17% of population, together they still number less
than 64%.  Besides, a few of the Muslims and Croats couldn't vote that
day.  That means that some Serbs and "Yugoslavs" also voted for Bos nia's
independence.  It took over a month before the EC agreed to extend the
recognition to R BH.  Despite the fact that R BH fulfilled all the legal
requirements, it is still the right of any sovereign state to either
recognize or not recognize any sta te it wants.  That right was used by
Greece not to recognize Macedonia, even worse, by using it's EC veto,
Greece succeeded in stalling the rest of Europe from recognizing
Macedonia.  Because the "EC" had the mandate from the UN to resolve the
Yugoslav c risis, with the Greek veto, even the UN recognition of
Macedonia was stopped.  Then some might ask how come that so many friends
and allies of Serbia recognized the independence of R BH?  The answer will
be given in the chapter "The new world order". 
 
The end of the third part.

[END OF PART THREE]

[PART FOUR]