The War in Bosnia - part five

                        CHAPTER SIX


                 THE WAR IN THE TUZLA REGION


                "The Patriotic League in Tuzla"


As was the case everywhere else in BH, the Serbs also had complete control
of the military and the police in Tuzla.  That is why the "Patriotic
League" (an organization of Bosnian patriots who formed military units in
order to fight for freedom of the Rep ublic of Bosnia-Herzegovina )
functioned under illegal conditions.  From the very inception of the
Patriotic League (PL) in Tuzla, I was part of its leadership: member of
the presidency of the political wing. The Serbian start of massacres of
Bosnjaks in Bijeljina, on Eid April 1, 1992 was also the start of our
innumerable sleepless nights.  The headquarters of PL was in the SDA party
housing.  We had telephone communications with Bijeljina, and the orders
were being issued by fax from "Kemo" and "Halil"  from Sarajevo.  I met
Kemo only once, but I never learned his real name.  Halil was Sefer
Halilovic, who eventually became Chief of Staff of the BH Army.  Our first
commandeer was a very capable organizer by the name of Adnan, from
Modrica. He was soon re placed by Vahid Karavelic Vaha.  Since were in a
fact working illegally, Vaha often hid at a surgeons, Dr. Fazlic, house in
Solina..  Dr. Fazlic was the man who later in the war organized many field
hospitals for the BH Army.  Because Solina was quite far from the center
of Tuzla, and there was no fuel during those days, Vaha stayed at my house
during the Bijeljina massacres.  That was actually quite dangerous.  The
headquarters building of the Tuzla Corpus of the JNA was in a building
next to mine, and t he police headquarters were just as close, but on the
opposite side from my house.  Vaha was a remarkable young man, quiet and
very humble.  He didn't fit the image of a commandeer. I remember one
particular episode that perfectly characterizes Vaha. 

During the massacres committed on April 1, '92 by Arkan cetniks (Serbian
volunteers officially, who committed many horrible crimes; but infect
commando units from Nis, Serbia, directly under the command of Slobodan
Milosevic), a large group of young Bosnj aks gathered in front of the SDA
headquarters in Tuzla.  We are not sure how, but two Serbs from the
neighboring city Lopare found themselves in the same location.  Most
likely they came to the wrong place, because the Serbian Orthodox church
and the SDS (Serbian Political Party) were located in the same park.  One
of these Chetniks was recognized by one of our men who was beaten by the
Serbs in Ozren as one of the participants in the beating.  Chetniks had
revolvers.  A mealy ensued in which the Bosnjaks captured the two Serbs. 
The capture of the Serbs occurred without anyone being in charge.  Vaha
observed all that as it wasn't any of his business.  I asked him: "Why
don't you take charge?"  He answered: "I handed over the command to
Senad."  (Mehdin Hodzic, known as Senad was an ex-policeman from
Makarska, Croatia, who returned to R BH in order to fight for its
independence.  Because Senad wasn't there at the time, in the general
confusion the two Serbs weren't even disarmed.  If they (the Serbs) were
just a little more alert, they could have killed us all.  When our men
wanted to permanently remove the revolvers from the two Serbs, Vaha
demanded that they be returned because they (the Serbs) had all the
necessary documentation to carry them.  At that time, the Chetniks were
slaughtering our people in Bijeljina, while we were releasing the same
Serbs without even confiscating their weapons.  I then told Vaha: " let's
make a deal that we will return the weapons to the Serbs if they ask for
it when they will be released, if they don't ask, we will keep the
weapons."  Of course, the Chetniks didn't even expect to be left alive,
let alone expecting to get their weapons back.  Ecstatic, the Chetniks
jumped in to their car full of meat and beer and left.  We should have at
least kept them and exchanged them for some of the Bosnjaks from
Bijeljina.  That way we could have at least saved a few Bosnian lives. 

Here I would like to say a few words about Mehdin Hodzic known as"
Senad," the policeman from Makarska, Croatia.  He realized that R BH will
be attacked so he placed himself at the disposal of the PL.  He had no
family, so he devoted all of his time in o rganizing our units.  He lived
without receiving any income, close to hunger.  Although the SDA party had
the legal right to employ in the regional police department, and although
Mehdin was a experienced and qualified policeman, there was always someone
"more important" for SDA leadership when hiring policemen. Finally I tried
to do something about his employment.  I went to see my then friend Mirsad
Berberovic, the "son in law"  of the president Alija Izetbegovic.  When I
told him about Mehdin, he calle d someone by the name of Sabirhafizovic
and told me that the matter will be taken care of.  Unfortunately, Mehdin
didn't see the resolution of his financial dilemma.  The war broke out
before he got the job. He died a hero at the very beginning of the war
near Zvornik, while destroying two Serbian tanks. 

From these sample can be seen how was the BH government formed; mainly
through family connections to Izetbegovic.  In a fact, Izetbegovic was
forming a private, and not a Muslim state.  That is why members of the
Bosnian bureaucracy are devoted to Izetbeg ovic, not to Bosnia. 

Let's go back to the PL (Patriotic League) of Tuzla.  All the actions
planned by Vaha (Vahid Karavelic) were unnecessarily complicated.  He used
his education acquired in the JNA and were all based on being followed by
a well trained and equipped army.  These planned actions couldn't have
been executed by people who had to buy their own weapons and had no
military training.  There was nothing we could do to help the Bosnjaks of
Bijeljina, while the Chetniks busses were passing only a few hundred yards
away from us on their way to the Bijeljina, town where they were
slaughtering thousands of Bosnjaks.  We should have and could have placed
a barricade on the road and stop them.  That probably wouldn't have saved
the people of Bijeljina, but it would have do ne wonders for our national
dignity.  That was later communicated to us from the people of Zivinice,
real dedicated fighters, who later formed a unity known as "Zivinicke Ose
(Wasps)."  They advised us that they are ready to erect barricades on all
the ma jor roads and also surround all the Serbian villages, as the Serbs
have doing to the Bosnjak ones.  However, nothing came of it.  The Serbs
(in fact JNA) continued to block our towns and villages, while traveling
unimpeded through our towns and villages o n to the battlefields like
Kupres, Bosanski Brod and others, where they were attacking other
Bosnjaks.  Meanwhile, the only thing that we were accomplishing were
useless and not enforceable grandiose plans of counteraction. 

The good guy Vahid Karavelic (Vaha) was so incompetent at the start of the
war that during some negotiations in his headquarters in Zivinice, he was
arrested by a Serbian officer and his two escorts.  Later the Serbs showed
on the Serbian TV Vaha's "confession".  I saw that Vaha didn't give away
some important details, he actually only told them what they already knew. 
The importance of that episode was in the fact that we had confirmation
that Vaha wasn't "planted" by the Serbs.  They would never treat one of
their own in such a manner.  During those days, everyone was a suspected
traitor, especially the ex officers of the JNA.  Later he was exchanged
for a Serbian Colonel.  During 1994 and 1995, he was the commander of the
BH army's First Corps.  He h ad great success in the Nisic and Treskavica
battle fields.  It looked like the BH Army reached the level of
preparedness where it could execute the "text book" action plans created
by Vaha. 

The action of helping Bijeljina didn't succeed because it was planned so
poorly that a mistake by even one of its participants could have
jeopardized the success of everyone else.  In that attempted action the
weakest links were the brothers Ramic from Brcko.  They didn't allow the
action to start in their region for the fear of upsetting the JNA.  They
(the brothers Ramic) were convinced that by being nice to the JNA, they
could divert their attention elsewhere.  Within Brcko, the Bosnian
soldiers (PL) t ook up position in some of the most solid and durable
buildings and prepared to defend their city from the Serbian onslaught. 
Brcko had a significant advantage, it borders Croatia, so it was much
easier to acquire weapons.  After four years of war, the d efenders of
Brcko still control 80% of their territory, even though the corridor
connecting Serbia proper and the western Bosnia goes through Brcko and is
of vital interest to the Rebel Serbs and JNA.  The "108th" Brcko brigade
repulsed many attempts by t he Yugoslav Army to widen the "corridor."  The
Brcko brigade could have also defend the remaining 20% of the region had
it not been for the fact that the brothers Ramic negotiated with the JNA. 
The officers of the JNA tricked the them, and the Brcko defe nders
withdrew from their positions. Now in Boston lives a Bosnian refugee from
Brcko, ex-prisoner of Serbian concentration camps in Brcko, by name Hikmet
Dindic who saw brothers Ramic calling Bosnians to give their weapons to
JNA, because "the peace in B rcko is negotiated". As soon as the Brcko
defenders withdrew, the JNA occupied the town center of Brcko and
proceeded to kill five thousand Bosnjak prisoners.  Mr. Dindic Hikmet is
one of the last 70 male from Brcko who survived Serbian occupation in Brck
o. I here do not accuse the brothers Ramic of treason.  I only accuse them
of promoting their self interests.  The brothers Ramic are people who
would do anything to clime the ladder of success.  Unfortunately,
thousands of Brcko citizens paid with their liver for the fulfillment of
the brother Ramic ambitions.  The carriers of brother Ramic are typical of
the carriers of most of Izetbegovic's collaborators.  They would newer do
anything without asking their leaders in Sarajevo. Hence, it is very
interes ting to ask them the following questions: Who told them to
negotiate with JNA?, and, Who told them to accept the withdrawal that
coasted so many Bosnian lives? 

The only way brothers Ramic could possibly make up for all the evil they
brought on to Brcko is to renounce any compromise and deals that could
give away Brcko and the Posavina region, the most fertile Bosnian lands,
which Izetbegovic has promised to the Serbs. 

However, the PL (League) also had some successes.  Some of our men were
successful in taking weapons from Serbian guards and policemen.  Besides
that, some weapons were brought to Tuzla from Visoko.  It was impossible
to make the journey from Visoko to Tu zla without going through some
villages in which Serbian rebel military units were already operational. 
I remember well that while the slaughter of Bosnjaks in Bjeljina was going
on (1992), Professor from the School of Mining at the University of Tuzla,
Dr. Sadudin Hodzic transported a load of weapons; 400 M48 rifles through
the Serb controlled territory.  Professor Hodzic risked his life for
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

Later, during the "real" war, our PL formed units became part of the
Bosnian army.  They played a major role in liberating many towns and
villages from around the Tuzla region. 

I hope that I was successful in shedding some light on the initial
confusion, amateurism and the lack of organization during the initial
phases of Bosnia's independence. 


             The Attack on the SDA headquarters in Tuzla

The attack on the SDA headquarters happened on the same day that the JNA
slaughtered thousands in Bijeljina and surrounded Janja.  But what led to
that? 

Because the SDA won the majority of votes in North East Bosnia, by the
agreement with SDS (Serbs) and the HDZ (Croats), it was entitled to
install a certain number of personnel in to the regional police
departments.  Regardless of the fact that slaughter of Muslims in Bjeljina
started before the Eid holiday, some members of the SDA took time off work
during the holiday.  When one of them, Alija Muminovic, who was also the
Representative in the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
told us tha t he would not work during the Eid, I was shocked.  He was
employed in the local police department in order to help Bosnjak during
this critical period, yet he took time of during most critical times in
the North East Bosnia. 

My sister also told me of her similar shocking experience when during the
holiday she called her good friend, Nerma Bicakic, the sister of a very
close Izetbegovic's associate, Edhem Bicakic. She was convinced that the
slaughter of Muslims committed durin g Eid shouldn't interfere with the
holiday celebrations at the Bicakic family.  Nerma told my sister that she
didn't wish to talk about the slaughter in Bjeljina since she was
celebrating the holiday.  That was part of the Bosnian stoicism that
didn't aba te even in war.  That is also the same apathy that helped to
form a Bosnian stereotype.  It is this same stoicism that does not allow
others on the Bosnian government to curb Izetbegovic in his division of
Bosnia, because then they might have to react and do something.  On the
other hand, we have the mentality of Seselj (a Serb leader) who because of
his "patriotic" beliefs gave up his position of a Professor on the
Sarajevo University and his apartment, long before the war.  This war
didn't "wake us up"  yet. 

Meanwhile, back in Tuzla.  Because of the Eid holidays, there were no
Bosnjak authority on duty in the local police, except for county police
the chief Hazim Rancic and commandeer of the Police station in Tuzla Mesa
Bajric.  Mesa Bajric was the communist delegate in the local (county)
Tuzla government, which was meeting that afternoon.  I happen to be at the
SDA Tuzla headquarters at that time.  I remember that Mr. Salko Bukvarevic
was also there.  He was the president of the young Muslims organization (M
OS). Our unit of PL was carrying weapons because of the situation in
Janja. In front of the building there was an armed guard.  Somewhere
around four PM, an excited Hazim Rancic came to tell us not to show our
weapons in public because Serbs from Tuzla we re calling the police
station to protest the "Green Barrettes," as the PL units were known. 
Because Mesa Bajric, Hazim Rancic were absent from their positions in the
police command, there was no Bosnjak representation on the police force.
The Serb rebels on the police force used that tactical error by the
Bosnjaks to issue an order to the police force to disarm the members of
the PL.  While we were talking to Rancic, a guard runs in and informs us
that the police force is surrounding the SDA building.  At that instant I
ran out from the SDA building and using the confusion by the police, I
escaped.  Right away I went to the Hall of the Workers University building
where the Tuzla City council was meeting, and I informed the president of
the Tuzla chapter of SDA Dr. Salih Kulenovic of the situation.  The Mayor
of the Tuzla Mr. Selim Beslagic, immediately started a debate on the
situation.  The delegates decided to ask the JNA for assistance.  The
continuing assertion by Izetbegovic that the rebel Serbs w ere not the
same as the JNA played a decisive role.  Alarmed and terrified people
start to believe even the words that give false hope.  That is how many
Bosnjaks, for example people from Brcko, surrendered to the JNA, so later
they could fall in to the hands of the rebel Serbs. For example, the
Bosnjaks were going in to the Bijeljina Army barracks looking for safety
and to hide from the "Arkanovci" (the most brutal of the Serbian
extremists), yet the "Arkanovci" were coming to the same Army barracks to
get additional ammunition.  Actually, it was "normal" for the "Arkanovci"
to get help from the Army since they were the "special" army units from
Nis, but just portraying themselves as being a non military unit. 

But SDA headquarters were saved from the "inside" and by the people
themselves.  The men who stayed inside called on the Bosnjaks from all the
neighborhoods.  From there a huge outpouring of people dispersed the
police surrounding the SDA building. 

The whole episode was a decisive one for Tuzla.  Up to then, Tuzla was
divided in to the left leaning group on one side and the SDA on the other.
That night I realized that among both the "reformers" and the communists,
left parties, of Tuzla there is a majority of those supporting an
independent and united Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Mr. Selim Beslagic, a
"reformer" and also the president of Tuzla city government (Mayor) came to
the SDA headquarters.  He suggested that the question of the SDA para
military unit (PL) be resolved by joining them to regular reserve units
of Bosnian police. He also offered a separate army post on a nearby hill
top.  Realizing the importance of this decision, I worked very hard to
influence the SDA leadership to accept that offer.  There were some "hot
heads" within the SDA, usually in the less educated" who advocated war
with the "commies," rather that with the rebel Serbs.  Dr. Salih
Kulenovic, the president of SDA Tuzla, also took interest in the Selim
Beslagic suggestion.  When I later visited those new Army barracks that
Beslagic secured for us, I realized that was the most strategic location
in the entire area.  It was overlooking all the major roadways connecting
Tuzla with the rest of Bosnia.  It also dominated the chemical industry,
one of the largest on the Balkans and to the power plants.  At that moment
I realized that mayor Selim Beslagic was a true Bosnian patriot.

While these meetings were being held in the SDA building, there were
people demonstrating in front.  They chanted: "we want weapons."  Somehow
they were convinced that our building was full of weapons.  Things were
getting so heated up that we were worrie d the people might try to storm
the building.  I went out to try to quell them.  It was the first time for
me that I was addressing a large group of people outdoors.  I explained
that the weapons of the TO (territorial Defense) were theirs.  I reminded
them that it was bought with their money for just such occasion: 
defending the people.  The JNA cheated them and removed all the weapons
from the TO (TO is abriviation for Bosnian military units in former
Yugoslavia) and is storing it in the JNA barracks in Tuzla. I told them
that instead of demonstrating here, they should be demonstrating in front
of the JNA Tuzla headquarters and demand the return of the TO weapons. 

Because the "Market" (a Balkan version of the "Farmers" market) was very
close to the SDA offices, many of the merchants participated at that
meeting.  Many of these merchants had less that perfect reputations, some
bordering on criminals.  However, that didn't prevent Selim Beslagic from
meeting with those merchants dealing in foreign currency.  He suggested
that they help him catch other black marketers that were coming from
Serbia.  The reason was simple: the Yugo money was printed in Belgrade, in
Serb ian hands and under control.  The purpose of the huge influx of these
worthless Yugoslav dinars in Bosnia was their conversion in to a stable
Western currency and also for the purchase of huge quantities of goods
from R BH. 

I get upset when I remember that even then Izetbegovic refused to issue a
Bosnian currency, eventually the war against Bosnia has already started
and Bosnia was recognized as a sovereign state. 

During those days, a different town was falling in to the Serbian hands
almost daily.  These Bosnian towns weren't armed that poorly that they had
to surrender so easily.  The scenario was always the same: our people
would take up defense positions, and t he rebel Serbs with JNA "muscles"
would ask to discuss the partition of the town.  From the SDA headquarters
in Sarajevo arrives the order to negotiate.  The rebel Serbs refuse to
negotiate until the Bosnjaks come down from the strategic positions.  The
Bosnjaks come down, at that moment the rebel Serbs and JNA attack and
kill everybody.  In fact, the same tactic was used by them during the
disarmament talks in Srebrenica in 1993, which they than took in 1995. 
Someone might say: "what dumb people."  How ever, people don't have a way
of making any decisions except through their politicians.  In the case of
R BH, all the decisions were made by Alija Izetbegovic.  But when
discussing Izetbegovic, it is important to remember that it wasn't his
stupidity but his intentional destruction of the Republic of BH. 

Using these same tactics, BH was completely surrounded by the middle of
April.  The only road not controlled by the Serbs was the so called "road
of Salvation."  That was a net of dirt roads over the Vran mountain. 
Using that road, during April 14 and 15 I took my family in to Croatia and
the relative safety there.  I took a whole day, 24 hours, to travel the
few hundred kilometers through the central Bosnia.  While traveling
through BH, I realized that the Croats were ready for the war. 

On an untold number of check points we were controlled by the Bosnian
Croats, dressing in camouflage uniforms.  The Bosnjaks had only a few
checkpoints, and they still wore the uniforms of the police reserves. 
Those were also the moment of the terrific C roat/Bosnjak friendship. 
Fear of the bloodthirsty Serb nationalists really brought the two victims
together (the Croats and the Bosnjaks).  You can imagine how far the
common misfortune has brought us together when a Croatian soldier on the
Vran mountai n, looking at my ID card and seeing that my name is Muhamed
but that I was born in Belgrade, told me: "Looking at your birthplace
(Serbia) I would normally execute you right away, but your name is
"correct".  While driving the car I didn't even hear when the nearby port
of Ploce was being bombed, so I drove with the lights on.  While under the
war conditions and while still under the fear from the spies, we were
stopped by an annoyed patrol with their guns pointed at us.  Again, the
name Muhamed saved us. 

I only rested for one day in Orebic, and right away I returned to Tuzla. 
The parting with my family was sad and difficult, especially for them.  We
didn't know if we will ever see each other again.  However, for me, there
was no dilemma.  My conscience w ouldn't allow me to abandon my homeland
under siege.  At that time that was still the case with majority of
Bosnians.  It wasn't important that we didn't have enough weapons.  We had
a country that was recognized and independent, and that was worth dying
for. 

                Tuzla Before May 15, 1992

When I returned to Tuzla, somehow, everything seemed different than before
I left.  During the few days of my absence, people of Tuzla have visibly
aged.  No one was laughing any more.  There was tremendous sense of fear,
but Bosnjaks didn't retreat.  I r emember one particular detail that
pictures determination of the Bosnjaks not to bow to the Serbs.  It was a
student of mine. Mirza Karamehmedovic, who later died as the commandeer of
a military unit that was nick named "Satans."  At that time he was a me
mber of a unit called the "Posta" (The Post Office).The unit was composed
of different ethnic groups and its orders were to guard the more important
buildings in the city, such as the post office, power stations and so on. 
It was composed of 120 fighters that were armed with the guns from TO,
that Selim Beslagic somehow "liberated" from the JNA.  Namely, back then
the JNA still acted as if it was different from the Serbian para-military
rebel units.  Using that tactic, they (JNA) was able to occupy posit ions
around Bosnian cities and those overlooking Bosnian roads.  The cities of
Brcko and Visegrad fell victims to those lies and later suffered some of
the worse slaughter the Serbs have committed.  In order to be able to
continue that "game," the JNA re turned a small part of the TO weapons to
Tuzla and Jajce. In Tuzla, the conditions were that the unit carrying
these weapons be of mixed ethnic groups.  That is how the unit "Posta" was
created.  Now back to Mirza.  In front of a small cafe, at the very end
of the October Revolution Street, four Serbs, in the JNA uniforms, were
siting down.  Mirza and one other soldier from his unit also happen to
stop by and have a drink.  They sat to the table next to the Serbs as if
they were just tourists.  The coffee house fell silent.  I saw all that
because I happened to be in the vicinity.  At first I thought that Mirza
was a child unaware of the danger.  I greeted him and joined Mirza and his
companion at their table. My intention was to warn him of the possible
incident with the four Serbs soldiers, since they were well armed.  After
hearing my warning, Mirza told me: "I know Professor.  My finger is on the
trigger.  But this is our homeland.  You wouldn't expect us to run, would
you?"  God, what a difference b etween the true, proud Bosnjaks and their
leader Izetbegovic, the man that keeps destroying our dignity by dragging
himself like slime behind Karadzic, traveling to all the capitals of the
world negotiating the end of our homeland. 

The Tuzla Council was calling on the volunteers to defend Tuzla.  I headed
towards the regional office of the peoples defense.  I was pleasantly
surprised.  There was a huge line of those answering the call.  Both young
and old, fat and skinny, bearded an d bold, peasants, workers and
intellectuals were quietly waiting in the hot sun, sweating, just so they
could become soldiers in the defense of their homeland.  I was so touched
that for the first time during the war, I cried.  I joined my people and
stoo d in the line.  I felt the overpowering strength of these miners,
students...good Bosnjaks.  I felt as we couldn't loose the war.  No one
can defeat people who are that motivated.  Then I saw a neighbor.  His
name was Enes Becic.  Until then I didn't know what was his profession. 
He asked me: "what are you doing here, professor?"  I replied "in the
army I was the calculator in the artillery and I know that there is a
shortage of such soldiers in the artillery. That is why I came.  I turned
out that Ene s was in charge of the recruiting station, so he took me
directly inside.  Because we still didn't have any artillery, there was no
need for my services, but they told me they would call me when needed. 

During the war, the men were not allowed to leave without the permission
of the military district.  Being remembered as the man who stood in line
to volunteer, I had no trouble getting the necessary passes.  That is why
during the first year of war, four times I had the opportunity to visit my
family that was living as refugees in Croatia.  Unfortunately, last time I
visited them (in March 993), the war between HVO and the BH Army in
Herzegovina erupted and I couldn't return to Bosnia any longer.  Soon a
fter the start of that conflict, HVO in Herzegovina massacred a convoy for
Tuzla.  Dr. Semso Tankovic, the president of the SDA in Croatia called on
me to speak as someone from Tuzla at a news conference in Zagreb Croatia. 
Among other things, I said that Boban (the leader of the wing of BH Croats
under the Tudjman control) was guilty because he has gotten greedy at the
Vance-Owen Plan, which awarded Croats ten BH towns where the Bosnjaks were
in majority.  All of the Croatian newspapers carried my speech , and
within few days, there weren't any Croatian newspapers where I wasn't
attacked by the leaders of the HDZ (Croatian Political Party).  Even Ivic
Pasalic, a very highly ranked HDZ official criticized my statement.  I
shouldn't even mention the anonymo us letters and the anonymous calls to
Dr. Tankovic.  Dr. Tankovic answered some of these accusation in the
press.  For me there was no more room in Croatia.  I had to escape to
America.  That is how it happened that I am so far from BH, my thoughts
are al ways there. 

                  May 15, 1992 - Liberation of Tuzla

Again, we must return to the events taking place in Tuzla Friday, May 15,
1992.  I arrived at work at the Engineering School at the University of
Tuzla, not suspecting that was an unusual day.  As always, we all had the
morning coffee together: the Serbs, Croats and the Bosnjaks.  At
approximately one PM, all of the Serbs left work.  They have all asked the
dean, Dr. Kapetanovic Izudin, to let them start their weekends early.  It
was only later that we realized that the Serbs knew that Tuzla was going
to be attacked later that day.  Because there were some very close
friendships between the Serbs and the Muslims, the was also a lot of
disappointment.  Bosnjaks were disappointed on how little they really knew
the Serbs.  The biggest disappointment came fro m a secretary from the
student activities, Milenka Savic.  She was very friendly with everyone,
yet she didn't tell even one of her Bosnjak friends to move their children
to safety that day.  I am mentioning this because it was characteristic of
things ta king place in Tuzla in those days.  Also, a physical education
teacher from the Mesa Selimovic High School, a Snezana Pejovic, was later
caught as a sniper.  Yet every firm in Tuzla had its Snezana and Milenka. 

The clash between the JNA and Tuzla started at approximately five PM. 
That was the ending to a very tense several days prior to that.  The
people of Tuzla surrounded the "Husinska Buna" army barracks, one of the
largest in Yugoslavia.  The reason was tha t many units of the
paramilitary Chetniks moved in to the barracks over the last few weeks. 
The Serbian generals were asking for Tuzla to be divided in to the Serbian
and the Muslim parts.  They started the same thing they did in Brcko,
Zvornik, Bratunac , Vlasenica, and so on.  What saved Tuzla was the fact
that Izetbegovic's political party, the SDA wasn't in charge, so the
Izetbegovic's strategy of dividing Tuzla by the neighborhoods didn't work
with city mayor, Mr. Selim Beslagic.  Instead of negotiating the division
of Tuzla as was suggested in all the other cities by Izetbegovic, Beslagic
told the JNA officers to "f... off"  That telephone conversation was taped
by the orders of SDA police leadership who was spying on Beslagic. 
Beslagic only talked about the JNA leaving Tuzla.  The corridor through
which they were to leave was also decided on.  The people of Tuzla, in
only a few days fabricated several armored transporters, which were used
to secure the important junctions.  Friday, May 15, the fir st part of the
column started for a place called Sjenjak.  The Serbs signal for the all
out attack on Tuzla was the attack on the gasoline pumps in Slavinovici. 
A bomb was thrown at two of our policemen.  At the same time, the second
half of the JNA colu mn started towards the city bypass highway.  At that
moment, our boys fired from the buildings in front of which the JNA column
was moving and the Bosnjaks in the armored transporter by which the first
half of the JNA column was moving also fired.  The wh ole thing last only
a few minutes and Tuzla was free. 

The same night, all of the TO weapons held at JNA barracks were liberated
by the Tuzla's Bosnjaks and distributed to their rightful owners.  All of
a sudden, it was many Serbian villages that were surrounded now.  Almost
every day a "Serbian" village was disarmed.  The Serbs had a very
difficult time with the Bosnjak fighters from Teocak and Sapna.  The
legendary Captain Hajro Mesic (pronounced Meshich) just in one day took
more than ten "Serbian" villages in the Tuzla region.  With that action,
he connec ted Teocak, Zvornik Kalesija and Tuzla.  Because some tie
earlier, the Posavina Bosnjaks have liberated Brod, Modrica and Derventa
and Orasje, a big part of the North East Bosnia was not only liberated, it
had a direct link with Croatia, and all of the Se rbian occupied regions
in Croatia and Western Bosnia were cut off.  It became obvious that Serbia
was quickly loosing the war.  Although the Serbs had enough weapons, they
offered no significant resistance.  That was because R BH was recognized
within its borders, which couldn't be denied or changed. 

They couldn't wait for their orders to go back to Serbia, because a Serb
can't survive where the "Gusle" (a Serbian traditional "instrument" for
epic songs against the "Turks") will not be the main musical instrument
and where there wouldn't be the epic S erbian songs about "slaughter of
the unarmed Turkish wedding." 

          First negotiations with territories and lands

The first person to return the fighting morale of the Serbs was the
Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman.  He started the secret negotiations
with the Serbs about the division of BH.  One of the "middle man" was
Butros Ghali himself.  He was asking from Tud jman a corridor for the
Serbs.  Tudjman didn't realize that by negotiating he was hurting the
Croats and greatly helping the Serbs.  It wasn't even important what they
would get, but the Serbs knew that by negotiating they will get something. 
That create d a vision to the Serbs of a successful conclusion to the war. 
However, Tudjman didn't just offer them that.  He gave the Serbs Posavina
in return for Herzegovina.  I met many HVO (Bosnian Croat) soldiers who
testify that Croatian battalions were ordered to withdraw from Posavina
without any apparent reason.  The HDZ leaders in Zagreb were justifying
the withdrawal of Croatian units from Posavina with the supposed fear of
sanctions against Croatia, because its troops crossed in to another
country. That w as not true. Croatia couldn't be punished if the legal
Bosnia Government asked for it. The proof that was not true is the fact
that Tudjman later allowed the Croatian Army to bombard the BH city of
Mostar, and the Croatia troops from Croatia were later he lping the BH
Croats to liberate Grahovo and Glamoc, without any fears of sanctions. 
Just as the Serbian troops were quick to retake the "corridor" by Brcko
(almost no resistance), the Croatians hardly had any resistance while
taking the left bank of the Neretva river.  After the quick advances on
the left bank of the Neretva river, from which the Serbs withdrew too
easily, the Croats stopped at the borders of "Banovina Hrvatska," (the
division of Bosnia between the Croats and the Serbs between the W.W.I and
the W.W.II).  It is interesting to see how these agreements are enforced
in the field.  For example, Tudjman couldn't tell the Posavina Croats (on
the Bosnian side) that he gave their homes and farms to the Serbs, after
they defended them for so long .  He does it by stopping any logistics
support and he withdraws any HV (Croatian army) units from the region. 
The only ones left are the local inhabitants who vastly outnumbered and
unarmed succumb to the Serbs.  A good example of such suffering are th e
villages of Kotorsko (Bosnjak) and the Croatian village of Johovac,
between Doboj and Modrice in Northern Bosnia..  These two villages were
abandoned to their own destiny.  For many days, they resisted the Serbs
from the Western Bosnia who started to br eak through a corridor.  54
Where the Croatian Army was supposed to offer resistance, there was no
Croatian Army there.  A similar fate awaited some Serb villages in
Herzegovina.  I know three soldiers in the HVO who swear that when their
HVO unit got carried away and pushed the Se rbs further than the border
agreed to between Tudjman and Milosevic were , they were fired on by other
Croatia units. 

The fall of the Posavina region is the realization of Tudjman's politics
relating to the ultimate goal of the division of BH.  At the same time,
the close cooperation between the Muslims and the Croats is still
encouraged wherever it is convenient to the Croats, such as the Posavina
corridor and at Bihac, the Achilles heal of the "Greater Serbia."  On the
other hand, those units of the Bosnian Army which are close to the
territories controlled by the HVO are considered the enemies.  That was
the reasoning behind allowing weapons for Tuzla to pass through HVO
controlled territory, but not the weapons destined to Zenica.  However,
even the amount of weapons for Tuzla is limited; enough to defend the
corridor but not to have a surplus.  At that time, the co mmandeer of the
Tuzla Corpus was Zeljko Knez, a Croat from Croatia and an obedient
Tudjmans soldier.  The free territory of Srebrenica was only a few
kilometers from the territory controlled by the Tuzla Corpus, yet not a
single bullet was fired to connec t the Eastern Bosnia with free Tuzla
region.  The people of Tuzla believed Zeljko Knez and naively and greedily
dreamed about Tuzla opening its own corridor to Croatia, and that they
will no longer have to depend on the HVO (BH Croatians under the Tudjman's
control) gangsters in Herzegovina.  Unsuccessfully, I tried to worn them
in the "Ratna Tribina" (The War Tribune) paper, then published in Tuzla,
that those are some gangsters stealing the weapons destined to Bosnia, but
that it was a part of Tudjmans politics.  That meant that even if Tuzla
did create a corridor North, to Croatia, there would be other "gangsters"
emerging to steal the weapons destined to Bosnia.  And that is besides the
fact that it was unrealistic for the Tuzla Corpus to think they c ould cut
the Serbian East-West corridor (and) hold it on their own.  They didn't
realize that the entire Yugoslav military would get involved in retaking
that corridor.  That is how it happened that Bosnia's strongest Corpus
ended up fighting for Tudjman in the Posavina corridor, while at the same
time allowing the Serbs to "cleanse" the Eastern Bosnia. Back on January
12, 1993 I wrote in the "Ratna Tribina" ("The War Tribune") the following
article entitled: "The Critical Battle For Bosnia.":

"It is difficult for any citizen of BH who loves his homeland and its
suffering people to hear the horrible news about the starvation in
Kamenica, Cerska, Konjevica, Zepa, Srebrenica and others.  Yet this time I
will not beg for humanitarian aid, but instead I would like to send a
message to the people who are deciding the strategy of the BH Army that
they are poor strategists if they don't see that it is exactly in those
places that the battle for BH will be won or lost.  There are only two
possible out comes to that Battle: the first possibility is the
catastrophe of a surrounded people, and that will happen if a corridor
isn't broken soon to connect them to the rest of Bosnia.  Our resistance
will crumble in those regions and Serbia will expand all the way to
Sarajevo, and it will be "ethnically cleansed."  When that happens, people
of Tuzla, Zenica and all the other Bosnians better reflect on their
prospects for a future, any future.  It is certain that if that happens,
the is no way that BH and the M uslims can survive.  The other possible
outcome to the Battle around the Eastern Bosnia that the BH army breaks
through at Caparde or some other place and reaches the surrounded Bosnjak
towns.  That would also cut all the Serbian communications that conne ct
the huge Serbian forces near Sarajevo with Serbia.  The victory would then
be ours and the borders of the Bosnian state will stay on the Drina river. 
Isn't that fact and the fact that by creating a corridor to connect
Eastern Bosnia with the rest of f ree Bosnia and the saving of hundreds of
thousands of women, children and our fighters, a good enough motivation
for such an action?  A byproduct of creating such a corridor would be the
liberation of Sarajevo. 

We understand that the opening of a corridor from Tuzla, North to the Sava
river would be of great significance for the North Eastern Bosnia. 
However, the Tuzla region is not completely surrounded and by creating a
corridor North would not save hundreds of thousands of lives, which would
be the main reason for a corridor to Eastern Bosnia.  The opening of the
Eastern Bosnia corridor would be of a tremendous humanitarian use also.  I
am afraid that any further postponing of such action would allow the Ser
bs enough time to fortify their positions and that the opening of either
corridor becomes impossible.  That is why I am suggesting immediate
action. 

                   CHAPTER SEVEN

         The SDA Cadre Politics During the War

               
                The influx of new Members


I have already mentioned Professor Sadudin Hodzic, who risked his life to
bring a shipment of weapons in to Tuzla.  Professor Hodzic was one of
those Bosnjaks who joined the SDA and the PL (Patriotic League) out of
shear patriotism.  However, majority of the later SDA leadership in Tuzla
were those who joined after May 15 (1992) and who by joining saw their
chances of advancement.  It doesn't matter to them that after 1990 they
were going among the students and have tried to talk them out of joining
any n ationalist organizations, meaning the SDA.  They are not ashamed
that they publicly cursed God when Dr. Fuad Muhic offered his services to
the SDA.  Using the techniques learned from the communist, they quickly
took the power from the true patriots, who a re mostly in uniforms and are
charging on the Serbian positions on Majevica mountain.  As opposed to the
actions of the original members, the new ones are "charging" the positions
that were held by the Serbs, including their apartments.  Overnight, they
changed their dresses from red to green.  The tragedy is in the fact that
with them they brought they communist ways.  We, the pre-war members of
the SDA freely criticized Izetbegovic whenever we saw him making a
mistake.  We were sending "Faxes" to the he adquarters in Sarajevo
whenever we thought there was a need for it.  Once the new members came,
all the free discussions ended.  They really weren't interested in
politics but only in their self promotion.  That is why they never took a
chance on anything.  That created a climate of conformity and the "rubber
stamping" of everything coming out of Sarajevo (from Izetbegovic).  Those
people are opportunists who will follow whoever is in charge.  They are
ready to create a personality cult.  I will not mention any of their
names.  I am only interested in them so I could answer to the following
often asked question: "If Alija Izetbegovic is wrong, why are Bosnjaks
then still following him?"  The answer is clear: Because of those
opportunist in among Bosnjaks who created a personality cult from
Izetbegovic.  They also created a Tito cult years ago, and later they spat
on him.  They would also turn against Izetbegovic, as they did during the
"Sarajevo process" just so they could ingratiate themselves to whomever is
in charge.  I don't have a single person in mind but their whole way of
thinking.

                     Pohara in Tuzla

A unique occurrence so important that it equaled that of the May 15, 1992
Serbian attack on Tuzla was created with the arrival of Izetbegovic's
special emissary, Armin Pohara.  I will describe the first meeting between
Pohara and the people of Tuzla, a me eting that I also attended.  The
meeting was held in the Islamic center of Tuzla, January of 1993.  Among
those attending were the Imams Hasan and Adil, the president of the Muslim
humanitarian organization, Merhamet, Custovic, the director of the almost
religious newspaper, "Zmaj od Bosne" (The Dragon of Bosnia) Edib Kravic,
Pohara and I.  Later we were joined by the secretary of the Tuzla Council,
Jasmin Imamovic, the actor Emir Hadzihafizbegovic, than an ex soccer
player and the organizer of humanitari an help from Turkey, Abid Kovacevic
and a few names I can't remember.  We discussed the creation of a Muslim
TV station in Tuzla, for which large amounts of money were already secured
by the SDA.  That is why the actor Emir was also invited.  Besides that ,
there was the need to decide who is going to be the leader of the newly
created Northeastern region.  That is why the secretary Jasmin Imamovic
was invited to the meeting.  Because Tuzla city was the largest free
municipality in the Northeastern Bosnia, it was natural for it to be the
most influential in that region.  Actually, the true leader of the people
already was Mr. Selim Beslagic, the mayor of Tuzla.  He fiercely fought
against Izetbegovic's negotiations with the Serbs in Geneva.  Beslagic and
I smet Hodzic (a candidate from the SDA for the Tuzla regions leadership)
sent a letter to the Bosnian negotiators in Geneva in which they opposed
any negotiation about the future of Bosnia with the war criminals.  That
letter was published in the Tuzla pap er "Front slobode" (The Freedom
Front).  Beslagic, the man in charge of the largest free Bosnian City
wasn't fighting for a smaller "Muslim" Bosnia but for a Bosnia free all
the war to the Drina river.  This is why Izetbegovic was manipulating the
expanded BH Presidency, in to dividing the free Bosnian territories in to
regions, similar to the Counties. He also ordered that all the
municipalities in the regions would have a equal number of representatives
in the regional assemblies, regardless of their si ze.  Although Tuzla was
larger than any ten of the other municipalities in the Northeastern
region, according to the new rules proposed by Izetbegovic, it had the
same number of representatives in the Assembly.  Because Izetbegovic SDA
won in all the othe r (village) municipalities, that meant that Beslagic
will loose his power.  But because of the great popularity of Beslagic,
people of the Northeastern region demanded that he stay in charge.  Pohara
came specifically in order to negotiate, cheat him and to eliminate
Beslagic from the position of the Regional leadership.  At that meeting,
through Pohara, Izetbegovic was asking Beslagic to join the SDA party.  In
other words; "you better give me your soul if you want power." 

Beslagic was not the kind of a man that would sell his soul for power, so
he didn't make a dear with Izetbegovic's emissary either, just as he
didn't succumb to the Serbian General Pracer. 

Pohara tried one more action in Tuzla. He started with the following
story: "Look, in Banja Luka, the Serbs are the majority, so Banja Luka is
Serbian.  In Mostar, the Croatians are the majority, so Mostar is
Croatian.  In Tuzla, the Muslims are in the ma jority, yet Tuzla isn't
Muslim but civilian.  In the BH Army, Muslims are 90% of the manpower, yet
the army isn't Muslim but it is "Bosnian army".  Whose fault is that and
what can be done to change it?"  My reply to him was; " If we accept Tuzla
as a Mus lim city just because the Muslims are in the majority, then we
must also accept the "logic" that Banja Luka is Serbian because the Serbs
are the majority, that Mostar is Croatian, and so on.  That means that we
would be accepting the Karadzic and Boban's logic of dividing BH, which is
in the best interest of our enemies."  Because of my persistence on that
point, Pohara's authority as the hero from Bosanski Brod and a special
emissary from Izetbegovic was invalidated, and at least at that time he
didn't s ucceed in getting support for his views on the "Muslim" Tuzla. 

Pohara succeeded in eliminating Selim Beslagic from the fight for the
presidency of the regional Assembly.  However, Dr. Sadudin Hodzic became
the president of the regional government and Ismet Hodzic became the
president of the regional Assembly.  Both o f them were members of the SDA
from before the war and just as Selim Beslagic, they were fighting for a
free and united R BH, not their carriers.  That is why they agreed with
Beslagic on the question of liberating all of Bosnia.  A question asked
here is , why did Izetbegovic replace one true patriot (Beslagic) so he
could bring another?  Because by constantly replacing the functionaries,
he was diminishing their authority and creating a more controllable
climate.  That was a genius move by Izetbegovic, t he total control of the
situation, if one considers what his ultimate goal was, the division of
Bosnia. 

Later Pohara was thrown out of Tuzla. Even the fact that he was a special
emissary form Izetbegovic didn't help.  He (Actually his sponsor,
Izetbegovic) created enough dissection and controversy in Tuzla.  He
started a battle for power instead a battle fo r the liberation of Bosnia. 
In the battle created by Pohara, many of the ex-communists were given a
chance, people who only know how to include themselves in to the
government, no matter what color it is. 

When one sees all those who were Pohara's "employers" at one time or
another: Tudjman, Izetbegovic, Boban and Fikret Abdic, it becomes obvious
that Izetbegovic is also playing on the team of those willing to divide
BH.  We should also remember that Izetbegovic's other special envoy,
Jasmin Jaganjac also worked for the same clique.  Others will have much
more to say about that, such as Sefer Halilovic (the ex-BH army commander) 
who was constantly attacked by the same group, and eventually removed
completely by Alija Izetbegovic.

The end of the 5th. part

[END OF PART FIVE]

[PART SIX]