BOSANSKI KONGRES

Report washingtonskog Ureda za Bosnu

     
                Washington Office for Bosnia
        Grass-Roots Empowerment and Liaison to Congress 
        933 N Street NW, # 102      Phone: 202-319-7615 
        Washington, DC 20001            Fax: 202-319-7652
     
Andrew Eiva                                     Dede Faller 
Congressional Liaison                           Grass-roots Outreach
     
     
     
Testimony of Andrew Eiva, Washington Office for Bosnia, before the House 
Committee on International Relations, Hearing on Balkan Policy, August 4, 
1999
     
     
        Thank you for inviting the Washington Office for Bosnia (WOB) to
provide testimony.  WOB represents eleven grass-roots groups in the US who 
came together to "hold President Clinton morally and politically 
accountable for the tragic consequences of the Dayton accords" (Hearing of 
the House Committee on International Relations, September 19, 1996, p. 
58).  WOB also helped those groups gain Congressional co-sponsors to lift 
the US arms embargo on Bosnia in 1995 and obtain signatories for Rep. 
Eliot Engel's (D-NY) letter demanding air strikes to block Serb cleansing 
of Kosova in 1998. 
     
        If you examine today's testimony by the preceding administration
officials closely, you will find they avoided defining clear goals and 
interests, although that was the subject of the hearing.  
To understand the goals behind most dubious conduct, the first step is to 
"follow the money," to ascertain who benefits most.
     
        1.      US Policy in Kosova Since the End of Bombing
     
        After the bombing stopped, our staff focused on what KFOR is
really doing in Kosova.  We questioned US military officers, regional 
experts, and KLA members in Kosova.  Our research has shown that while the 
official Administration position is that Milosevic must be removed from 
power, in practice KFOR has helped Milosevic retain significant economic 
and military power.
     
        1.  KFOR is allowing the Serbs to retain control of the $5 billion
Trepce mine complex.  The Trepce complex includes 20 major mines and 
processing plants with tens of thousands of employees.  The real estate 
value of Trepce is about $5 billion. It has reportedly made millions of 
dollars for Milosevic personally (New York Times, July 8, 1998, page A4). 
Trepce is the key to Kosova's economic future.  
     
        KFOR placed Trepce in the French sector.  The French, who often
colluded with Serb ultranationalists in the past,  immediately partitioned 
the nearby town of Kosovska Mitrovica, letting the Serbs keep the northern 
half, where the valuable Trepce-related plants and factories are located. 
The Serbs had already cleansed the Kosovars from this northern part, where 
they had been a pre-war majority.  When Kosovar refugees tried to return 
home, French troops blocked their way.  The Trepce complex remains under 
Milosevic's control.  Meanwhile, behind the KFOR shield, hundreds of Serbs 
are being moved into the Trepce complex according to KLA reports.  KFOR 
appears to be rewarding the perpetrators of cleansing at the victims' 
expense.
     
        Although NATO bombed Serbia's economy, KFOR is protecting
Milosevic's personal economy.  This helps him retain power and 
impoverishes his opposition. 
     
        2.  The Serbs are leaving covert units in Kosova, and KFOR looks
the other way.  Milosevic insisted on the right to keep paramilitary units 
in Kosova until forced to concede at the end of negotiations. 
Nevertheless, the Serb "Frenki" paramilitary brigade was spotted preparing 
to stay behind covertly despite NATO orders (Sunday Times of London, June 
6, 1999).  Since then, media reported violence involving armed Serbs in 
Pec, Orahovac, Zegra, and Gniljane. Anonymous NATO officials leaked that 
"hundreds, possibly thousands" of Serb troops remain in Kosova (London 
Sunday Telegraph, July 4, 1999). 
     
        During ex-Senator Robert Dole's visit to Pec, witnesses saw Dusko
Milacic, a famous member of the  "Frenki" paramilitary brigade, sneaking 
out of the city.  Italian KFOR soldiers on the scene ignored the reports, 
claiming nothing was happening (Kosovapress, July 6, 1999).
     
        Gniljane, in the US sector of Kosova, was the main hub of Serb
"stay behind" activity in June and July, according to KLA reports.  But a 
US military officer just back from Gniljane played down the threat in 
Washington last week, saying "There was a lot of concern [about 
stay-behind units] in the beginning, but I do not hear about it any more." 
Just a week before his report, however, U.S. forces had arrested four Serb 
paramilitaries in Gniljane, and merely returned them to the Serb 
authorities, stating that no action would be taken against the four men 
because they were "very close to the border" (Reuters, July 23, 1999).  In 
fact, Gniljane is not close to the border.  KFOR may be signaling that it 
will not punish Serb paramilitary activity in Kosova, acquiescing to 
Milosevic's intent to keep covert armed forces there.
     
        2.      US Policy Impact on Bosnia Since Dayton
     
        In Bosnia as in Kosova, following the money provides clues to the
real goals of US policy.  Administration officials admit that not enough 
has been done to implement refugee return.  About 1.5 million Bosnians 
still cannot go home.  While they suffer, however, others profit.  About 
250,000 homes which formerly belonged to Bosnian citizens are now 
controlled by  Republika Srpska.  The average value of such homes is 
$40,000.  Republika Srpska's resulting real estate windfall is thus about 
$10 billion.
     
        US policy tools are solidifying this potential real estate
windfall.  The US: 
     
        gerrymandered elections in Bosnia to reinforce ethnic divisions or
create new ones;
     
        funded reconstruction of housing on an ethnic basis, strengthening
Republika Srpska's boundaries.  Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) stated that 
our reconstruction aid rewards ethnic cleansing (Foreign Relations 
Committee Hearing, July 17, 1997);
     
        chopped up the Ploce-Samac railroad, Bosnia's key rail artery,
among the three ethnic statelets; and
     
        led SFOR in manning an Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), which
cements Republika Srpska's boundaries.
     
        The Bosnian people have begun to recognize the results of US
policy.   On the eve of President Clinton's visit to the Stability Pact 
Summit in Sarajevo last week, Bosnian activist Ibran Mustafic was arrested 
for possessing 10,000 leaflets he planned to distribute to officials and 
media attending the summit.  The leaflet's title was Save us from Dayton!, 
and it set forth SFOR's complicity with Milosevic's agenda in Bosnia. 
Mustafic was distributing the leaflets on behalf of the Mothers of 
Srebrenica and Podrinje Association, which he leads.  A group of women from 
the same association smuggled their posters past cordons of police officers 
to get the same message through. 
     
        Haris Siladjic, current co-chair of Bosnia's Council of Ministers,
repeatedly asked for the use of force to return the refugees  (Balkan 
Crisis Report No. 49, June 22, 1999).  But US troops have  done the 
opposite. According to Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI), "US troops have 
reinforced ethnic cleansing."   In effect, they protect Republika Srpska 
and its real estate windfall.  In Bosnia as in Kosova, US policy is on a 
collision course with the aspirations of the people.
     
        3.      US Interests at Stake in Our Balkan Policy
     
        The key American interests in Balkan policy are outside the
Balkans.  On the night he began bombing Serbia, President Clinton 
explained US interests as follows:  "Ending this tragedy is a moral 
imperative.  It is also important to America's national interests."  The 
President, like Congress, put our moral interest in Kosova ahead of other 
national interests.  
     
         US policy is about to squander a chance to make "never again" a
meaningful factor in US foreign policy.   Congress made scores of 
legislative attempts to correct US moral myopia since Serb aggression 
began.  While Bosnia and Kosova do not equal Rwanda in scale, the Balkan 
television coverage exposed Americans to the moral issues at stake in a 
way future presidents may not enjoy.  In grass-roots efforts around the 
country, people personally touched by the Holocaust often took the lead. 
Yet the Clinton administration is pretending to oppose the cleansing while 
rewarding it in Kosova and Bosnia. 
     
        Rewarding cleansing encourages its spread.  Rwanda and Chechnya
followed Bosnia. After Kosova, Sandzak may be next.  Abandonment of moral 
interests can affect strategic interests.  
     
        US Balkan policy is encouraging the rise of Russian
ultranationalism which could destabilize the 20,000 nuclear weapons in 
Russian hands.  Russia, with an arc of Muslim countries to its south, has 
a serious interest in amicable relations between Orthodox and Muslim 
civilizations.  When Serb aggression in the Balkans began, Russian Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev offered to provide Russian transport planes to 
ferry UN troops from Muslim countries to help Bosnia. But since then, 
years of Western acquiescence in Milosevic's aggression have emboldened 
Russian ultranationalists.
     
        US Balkan policy could encourage Serb aggression in Sandzak,
Vojvodina, and Montenegro.  Although the media has covered the threat to 
Montenegro and somewhat less to Vojvodina, it has overlooked the 300,000 
Muslims of Sandzak, where low-level cleansing has already begun. 
Sandzak's Muslims are the most prosperous in the Balkans, making them a 
tempting target for cleansing. 
     
        US acquiescence in the destruction of Bosnian and Kosovar
statehood could increase the chance of a clash between Western and Muslim 
civilizations.  Although about 5 million members of the US Muslim 
community have not yet fully engaged in the American political process, 
their awareness of US policy is rapidly growing.
     
     
New policies can better serve US interests:
     
Congress should deprive Milosevic of his $15 billion profit from cleansing 
as follows: 
     
        1)      Reunite Bosnia and dismantle Republika Srpska, thus
eliminating Milosevic's $10 billion real estate windfall;
     
        2)      Support Kosovar independence and territorial integrity,
including Kosova's sovereignty over the $5 billion dollar Trepce complex; 
and
     
        3)      Empower Serbs, Croats and Muslims of good will in a
Balkan-wide coalition of tolerance against the forces of hatred
     
        It is time for Congress to reject any further funding of the
counterproductive administration Balkan boondoggle.  By asserting 
America's moral interests, Congress will be at its best.  Nothing less 
will do when the administration is at its worst.